Using social tables, we make an estimate of global inequality (inequality among world citizens) in early 19 th century. We then show that the level and composition of global inequality have changed over the last two centuries. The level has increased reaching a high plateau around 1950s, and the main determinants of global inequality have become differences in mean country incomes rather than inequalities within nations. The inequality extraction ratio (the percentage of total inequality that was extracted by global elites) has remained surprisingly stable, at around 70 percent of the maximum global Gini, during the last 100 years.
Introduction: Pre-industrial global inequality
The studies of global, and a fortiori, global pre-industrial inequality are a relatively recent phenomenon and they are few in numbers. Obviously, the reason for that is the lack of household survey data that are needed for an estimate of global inequality, that is of income distribution across all individuals in the world. The lack of household surveys and their variable quality is a problem that plagues even contemporary studies of global inequality. It is much more severe for the studies of past inequality. But even the very concept of global inequality-that is, of measuring and comparing incomes of (theoretically) all individuals in the world, is a new one, both because the idea of such a study had to wait for a more advanced process of globalization to take hold, and because it crucially depends on the availability of purchasing power parity estimates that are needed to convert national currency incomes into a single global numeraire.
There are only two long-run empirical historical studies that exist up to now (to the best are not all really independent data points but estimates based on posterior data. 2 Although 3 their approach was in several respects less than ideal, it was, at that time, perhaps the only possible since historical income distribution data are so scarce.
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More recently, Baten, Foldvari, van Leeuwen, and van Zanden (2009) [in the rest of the text BFLZ] have expanded and improved on the Bourguignon and Morrisson approach by using for the countries for which actual income distribution data were lacking either (i) an estimate of inequality based on the evolution of the unskilled wage/GDP ratio, 4 or (ii) by substituting for countries' missing income distributions, the data on the distribution of individual heights. For (i), if unskilled wage-to-GDP ratio increases, the assumption is that income inequality declines; for (ii), if there is a strong relationship between distribution of individual heights and distribution of income, then we can -enrich‖ the dataset on countries' income distributions by adding the data on countries for which we possess the distributions of heights. 5 In that way, the Bourguignon-Morrisson -backward projections‖ are not used at all. The other building block of the exercise, the reliance on
Maddison's GDP per capita data, was unchanged. estimates for the years in-between. Third, I apply the concept of the inequality extraction ratio (used earlier by Milanovic 2006, and Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson, 2009 within country-wide framework) to global scale. In other words, I ask how close was global inequality between citizens to its maximum feasible amount (given global mean 4 income) during the last two centuries. I conclude the paper with some speculative notes, which should be improved in the future. . Since the subsistence minimum is by assumption priced at $300 PPP dollars at 1990 prices, we again directly get the conversion factor (1 ducat from year 1811 = $PPP 9.67 in year 1990). Using this conversion factor, we convert mean contemporary ducat incomes of each social group into 1990 $PPP equivalents.
We thus obtain $PPP-equivalent average incomes for all 591 social groups that are included in our sample. The number of groups and their population sizes vary between the countries. The average number of groups ranges from only 3 for China in 1880 and Nueva Espaňa in 1790 to 375 occupational groups for Brazil 1872. The average number of groups per country is 45 (without Brazil, the average number of groups drops to 18).
On average, therefore the number of groups is sufficiently large to provide a reasonable 7 estimate of overall inequality within each nation. 7 Although a small number of groups biases the national Gini downward, the bias need not be strong if the social structure of a society is not very complex. For example, if most of peasants lived at, or near, the subsistence minimum in China around 1880, then the fact that we have only three social groups for China, need not imply a strong downward bias to the calculated inequality.
(The presumption is also that the authors of social tables divided each society into salient and sufficiently income-differentiated groups, so that most of country's inequality is captured by income differences between the social groups.)
Global inequality around 1820. The average income for our sample is exactly $PPP 600.
The country with the highest mean income is England and Wales 1801-03 with $PPP 2000, the country with the lowest, Moghul India in 1750 with $PPP 530.
Inequality indices for the sample are given in Table 1 . The global Gini works out as 38.5. Number of independent data points 591 <767 <363** n.a.
Note: The difference in total population in Columns (2) and (3) stems from the fact that countries with social tables enter population in column (2) with their actual populations in the year when the social table was created while in Column (3) they enter with their populations in year 1820. Thus in column (2) India's population is 182 million and in Column (3) it is 209 million. The 100 percent coverage by Bourguignon and Morrisson has to be taken by grain of salt since the data were -forced‖ (through generous use of estimates) to cover 100 percent of the population. * Calculated directly from the Bourguignon-Morrisson tables, Data_WD19.xls (supplied by the authors separately from the paper). ** See footnote 1 above. *** The number of countries is not fully comparable. For example, Bourguignon and Morrisson, treat Bangladesh/Pakistan and India as two countries; we treat them as one as the 1750 data refer to the entire subcontinent. *** BFLF (Table 4) give 88 percent for their coverage but that number seems to be based on somewhat higher estimate of world population in 1820 (1.046 billion) than what we use here.
The changing composition of global inequality, 1820-2002
While the social tables and (obviously) the survey data for the early 19 th century are not fully available so that global inequality must always be estimated quite approximately,
Maddison's GDP data allow us to compute with much more precision Concept 2 inequality. Concept 2 or international population-weighted inequality is an inequality index computed across GDPs per capita of countries at a given point in time, where each GDP per capita is weighted by country's population (see Milanovic, 2005) . 
Global inequality =
where y j = mean income or GDP per capita of country j, p j = population share of country j, π j = income share of country j (country j-th share in global income), μ = global average per capita income, and L = overlap term (which can be treated as part of the within component; it is greater than zero any time there are people from a poorer country that are better off than some people from a mean-richer country).
The difference between the Concepts 2 and 3 consists of intra-national inequality or, in other words, of the within component. Today, the between component-on account of huge differences in mean incomes between the countries-represents at least 85 percent of global inequality. 9 But was this the case in the past? (It has been decreasing in the last twenty years thanks to high growth rates of China and India. 10 )
As the last two columns in Table 2 ). 11 See Milanovic (2009) . 12 Using Theil (0) index, the share increased by a factor of eight. = 35 percent due to differences in average country incomes (15 Gini points) + 65 percent due to within-national income differences (28 Gini points).
Early 21 st century: Inequality between individuals in the world: Gini around 70.
= 85-90 percent due to differences in average country incomes (60-63 Gini) + 10-15 percent due to within-national income differences (7 Gini points).
These two simple relationships describe the change that has occurred globally during the last two centuries: inequality between individuals is much higher today than 200 years ago, but -more dramatically-its composition has totally reversed: from being predominantly driven by within-national inequalities (that is, by what could be called -class‖ inequality), it is today overwhelmingly determined by differences in mean country incomes (what could be called the -location‖ or citizenship inequality). This latter, -locational‖ element was -worth‖ 15 Gini points in the early 19 th century; it is -worth‖ 60-63 Gini points today.
The evolution of the share of between inequality in global inequality is shown in Figure   1 . Table 2 ), the share of the between-country inequality in the 19 th century would be slightly higher. The trend would not be affected however. 
Did global inequality extraction ratio decline?
Definition of the inequality extraction ratio. MLW (2009) have developed the concept of inequality possibility frontier. Simply put, this is the maximum Gini that is achievable at a given level of mean income provided that all population but an infinitesimally small elite live at least at the subsistence minimum. To understand the concept intuitively, imagine a society whose mean income is just barely above subsistence. Then the maximum Gini, however small the elite (at the extreme, the elite could be composed of one individual), cannot be high because a vast majority (99.999% etc.) of bilateral income comparisons that enter into the creation of Gini will yield zeros (since all other individual but the elite have the same, subsistence, income). As the average income grows, the constraint on the maximum Gini is relaxed. The inequality possibility frontier, the locus of maximum Ginis as mean income rises, is given by equation (2):
where α = average income of a community expressed in terms of subsistence, G* = maximum feasible Gini, and ε = the share of the elite in total population. Clearly as ε→0, (2) simplifies to:
Thus, for example, if the average income of a community is twice the subsistence, the maximum feasible Gini will be 50 ((2-1)/2 expressed in percentage terms). But if, as in modern rich societies, the average income is some 100 times the subsistence, than the maximum feasible Gini is 99, very close to what we tended to regard (before the introduction of G*) as the maximum Gini regardless of average income level.
For Theil(0), the maximum feasible inequlaity is:
The ratio between the actual (measured) Gini, G, and the maximum feasible Gini (G/G*)
gives the inequality extraction ratio which can be interpreted as the share of maximum inequality extracted by the elite. Clearly, as that percentage increases, the elite can be said to have been more successful in extracting the surplus. The approach has been applied by MLW to thirty pre-industrial societies, running from the Imperial Rome in year 14 to Siam and Kenya in 1927. 13 The average extraction ratio over these thirty societies is 75 percent. For seven societies (six of them colonies), the extraction ratio was around 100 percent-that is, the inequality was pushed close to its maximum, compatible with the physiological survival of the society. (Note that the Gini can even exceed the maximum if some people temporarily survive at less than the subsistence. In the medium term, the extraction ratios above 100 percent are possible only if population decreases.)
The stylized, but also very consistent picture, for modern developed societies is that of a decreasing inequality extraction ratio with rising mean per capita income. For example, for England and Wales (later United Kingdom) for which we have the most complete data series, the inequality extraction ratio drops from 70 percent in 1290 (when England's α was 2.1) to about 55 percent in 1688 and 1759 (α's of respectively 4.7 and 5.9), increases to 60 percent in 1801 (α=6.7), and then begins a more or less steady decline to 38 percent today (α=66). 14 In other words, inequality in developed countries generally decreased, or even when it went up, it increased less than the maximum feasible inequality.
Global results. Now, the question can be asked: can the same methodology be applied globally? The answer is yes, but with one important caveat. When this methodology was applied to individual countries, it made sense also in implicitly assessing how rapacious or successful was the elite in extracting the surplus. Combined with an analysis of class structure of a given society (e.g., the share of the middle classes), it provided an insight into the social and political structure of a polity. At the global level, however, there is no single elite and no single government (then or now) and the application of the methodology makes sense certainly in an accounting sense, but perhaps much less as a tool that would enable us to gain further insight into the social structure of a given society (with society being here -the globe‖). Yet, perhaps depending on one's perspective (e.g., taking a -world-systems‖ perspective) the global inequality extraction ratio could be seen as more than an accounting tool. In effect, the results obtained below will, to some extent, lead us to pose, if not to answer, that question.
The -accounting‖ part is useful not the least because we may want to know whether the low measured Gini in the early 19 th century (around 43 Gini points) can in part be -explained‖ by the overall low level of global income. Or differently, whether the increase in global inequality that we observe in the last two centuries is associated with the removal of the constraint that low income sets to maximum feasible inequality.
Using the data on global average income (GDP per capita) from Table 2 and assuming the subsistence minimum to be $PPP 300 (as in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson, 2009 ) we can directly calculate G* (see Table 3 ). Gini thus broadly keeping the inequality extraction ratio unchanged (see Figure 2 , left panel).
Combining this with the earlier finding that the composition of global inequality has shifted from being -caused‖ by internal factors, like domestic income distribution, to -external‖ like differences in mean country incomes, we can conclude that the main -inequality extractors‖ today are not (within)-national elites, but an elite which is basically composed of citizens of rich countries. 15 The result also shows why the Bourguignon-Morrisson estimate of Gini 50 for global inequality in 1820 is implausibly high. Using their own global mean income of $PPP 652, it can be shown that the maximum feasible Gini could be only 54 points and that the inequality extraction ratio would have to be greater than 90 percent. This cannot be totally rejected but seems implausibly high in light of the results for the subsequent years.
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We can summarize the change that occurred over two centuries as follows:
Early 19th century: Global mean income was 2.3 times the subsistence. Maximum feasible global Gini was 56 while the actual global Gini was around 43. Thus, actual inequality -exhausted‖ some ¾ of maximum inequality.
Early 21 st century: Global mean income is 19.6 times the (same physiological) subsistence. Maximum feasible global Gini is 93 while the actual global Gini is around 70. Thus, actual inequality -exhausted‖ (still) some ¾ of maximum inequality. Table 3 ). [From summary_utrecht.dta. ] Why is the world income distribution such that during the last century, the rich have extracted a constant of about 70 percent of global maximum feasible inequality? This is a question that I cannot try to answer now. But it may be addressed in another paper.
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However, for the future we may hazard some projections. Since global mean income is already quite high, almost 20 times the subsistence, the increase in the maximum feasible Gini will be quite limited. This means that the only venue for the reduction in global inequality extraction ratio remains an effective reduction in measured global inequality (which currently stands at 70 Gini points). For it to go down, inter-country differences in mean incomes must decrease, and in particular those between poor and rich populous countries. Thus, both global inequality and global inequality extraction ratio fundamentally depend on what I called elsewhere (Milanovic 2005) , the relationship within the triangle of China, India and the United States. If the mean-normalized absolute distance between China and India, on the one hand, and the US, on the other, decreases, then we are likely to observe favorable developments in this century. 
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be made.
1. Global inequality around 1820 was probably around 43-45 Gini points rather than 50 points as estimated by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) . The latter value would have implied an unlikely high inequality extraction ratio of around 90 percent.
2. Global inequality increased from Gini of 43-45 points in the early 19 th century to some 65-70 Gini points today. Even more remarkable is that the composition of global inequality changed from being driven by class differences within countries to being driven by locational income differences (that is, by the differences in mean country incomes). The latter accounted for only 15 Gini points around 1820, but account for more than 60 Gini points today.
3. Although the inequality extraction ratios have steadily and often dramatically decreased within individual countries as they developed in the course of the last two centuries (see MLW, 2009) , the global inequality extraction ratio has only mildly declined since its 19 th century level and has remained stable in the last 100 years.
4. This means that global inequality has increased at about the same rate as the maximum feasible inequality (the latter's increase being determined by the rise in mean global income), leaving the global inequality extraction ratio at around 70 percent.
5. The implication of (a) changing composition of global inequality and (b) stable inequality extraction ratio is that the main -inequality extractors‖ today are citizens of rich countries rather than individual national elites as was the case two hundred years ago.
